Introduction
Augustin Cournot studied the oligopoly markets operation where each company acts knowing that the volume of production affects the market price (Binmore, 1999) . He defined the balance as a situation where each company chooses the output which can maximize its profit while taking into account the output forecast by the other companies. He showed that such balance leads to a price above the marginal productivity (Sirghi, 2008) .
Lately, there are many articles that studied Cournot game with bounded rationality, considering different demand and cost functions (linear and nonlinear) (Aziga, 1999; Aziga & Elsadany, 2003 Aziga et al., 2001 Aziga et al., , 2002 Aziga et al., , 2013 Elsadany, 2010; Kopel, 1996; Sheng et al., 2013; Yassen & Aziga, 2003) . Also, heterogeneous players into Cournot game were taken into consideration. (Aziga & Elsadany, 2003 Dubiel-Teleszynski, 2011; Onozaki et al. 2003; Zhang et al., 2007) .
Due to incomplete information and delayed decisions, the delay is introduced in nonlinear discrete Cournot duopoly games and the dynamics is analyzed (Dubiel-Teleszynski, 2011; Ma & Ji, 2009; Sirghi, 2008) .
Based on Binmore (1999) , Ma and Ji (2009) , and Mircea, Neam‫܊‬u and Opri‫܈‬ ( 2004) , in this paper a dynamic nonlinear Cournot duopoly is described by an economic game, where two firms are on the market with a homogenous consumption product. The firms do not cooperate, which means there is no collusion. Each firm's output decision affects the good's price. Moreover, firms compete in quantities and choose the quantities simultaneously. Because the decisions of the economic agents at time t take into account the past decisions, we introduce the distributed time delays as weak and Dirac kernels. We determine the Nash equilibrium point and we analyze the stability and the existence of the Hopf bifurcation.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the dynamic Cournot duopoly with bounded rationality and distributed time delay is presented. In Section 3, for the weak and Dirac kernels, the local stability and the existence of the Hopf bifurcation are analyzed. In Section 4, numerical simulations are performed in order to illustrate the theoretical findings. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. (Kopel, 1996) :
The Mathematical Models
is the total output, m>n>0.
According to (Ma & Ji, 2009) , the cost function of F1 is nonlinear and the cost function of F2 is linear. The second firm has lower variable cost that the first firm. The cost functions for 1 F , respectively 2 F , are given by:
The profits of the firms are:
where 1>Ƣ>0 is the depreciation.
For the game between the firms and long-term repeated dynamic process in market, the assumptions are: the players (the firms) do not have a complete knowledge of the market and they follow a bounded rationality adjustment process based on the estimation of the marginal profit (Agiza & Elsadany, 2003; Onozaki et al., 2003) . The firms decide to increase/decrease their output if they have a positive/negative marginal profit. The dynamic adjustment of this repeated Cournot duopoly game with bounded rational players is as follows: Combining (1), (2), (3), (4), a dynamic duopoly game with bounded rationality, associated to two firms, has the following form: The parameters of (5) are nonnegative real numbers.
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In what follows, we consider the distributed delay structure, because the decisions made by the economic agents at time t depend on past observed variables. The functional relationships describing the dynamics of the model may not only depend on the current state, but also in a nontrivial manner on past states.
We propose that the distributed delay decisions are described by
where i k are pricewise continues and:
The functions i k , are called kernels. For
, we define:
Therefore, the dynamic game model (5) with distributed delays is as follows: In what follows we analyze system (8) for:
3. Stability analysis of systems (5) and (8) The systems (5) and (8) 
and 10 q is given by: 
Because (12) 
The characteristic equation of (16) 
The characteristic equation of (18) is: 
Proposition 2
The characteristic equation (21) (26). From (31) we obtain (25). Let ) ( 2 τ λ be the root of (23). Deriving (23) with respect to 2 τ we have: 
From (32) we get (28).
Proposition 4
Assuming the hypotheses from Proposition 3 hold. Then, we have:
then all the roots of (23) have negative real part. One can get that the equilibrium point 0 E of system (8) 
Numerical Simulation
For the numerical simulation we consider the following parameters: m=5. 20, n=0.95, b1=0.42, c1=0.25, b2=0.37, Ƣ=0.15, Ơ1=0.02, Ơ2=0.03, w1=0.5, w2=0.5 . We use Maple and Matlab.
Using (14) and (15) we obtain the equilibrium point: q10=0.9697533802, q20=0.754967037.
If there is no distributed delay, the characteristic equation (21) has the roots: ƪ1=-0.7371360357, ƪ2=-0.2797361134. The equilibrium point is locally asymptotically stable. The total output, Q(t), the profits Ư1(t), Ư2(t) and the costs C1(t), C2(t) has the following orbits : 
Conclusions
In this paper, the dynamics of a nonlinear duopoly game with bounded rationality and distributed time delay is analyzed. The game is described by a nonlinear differential system with two equations which contain distributed time delays, because the decisions made by the economic agents at time t depend on the past decisions.
For two types of kernels, weak and Dirac, the stability of equilibria and bifurcation are investigated. It is found that if there is no delay the equilibrium point is locally asymptotically A similar analysis will be carried out for and other types of kernels: strong, uniform, or Gauss. Because the parameters of the real models are subject to perturbations, then in our next paper we will consider the stochastic model with distributed time delay.
